Testing liberal norms: the public policy and public security derogations and the cracks in European Union citizenship by Kostakopoulou, Theodora & Ferreira, Nuno
University of Warwick 
School of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-18
Testing Liberal Norms: The Public Policy and Public Security Derogations and the 
Cracks in European Union Citizenship
Theodora Kostakopoulou 
University of Warwick - School of Law
Nuno Ferreira 
University of Liverpool 
 2 
 
1. Introduction
1
 
 
Crises in liberalism are not merely triggered by exogenous factors, such as international 
terrorism, wars, global economic downturns and natural disasters. They can also emerge 
endogenously when basic principles underpinning liberalism come adrift and, like soap bubbles, 
fluctuate and then burst when they come into contact with a new idea or a harsh reality. One such 
harsh reality is insecurity of residence and the principles of liberalism that it challenges are 
freedom from state coercion, human emancipation from unnecessary restrictions and the equal 
treatment of all individuals irrespective of their place of birth and nationality.  
We take it as given that citizens have the right to enter and reside freely and 
unconditionally in the country they call ‘their own’.2 Migrants, on the other hand, can never take 
security of residence for granted. Notwithstanding the length of their residence in the territory of 
the host state and their immersion into a multifarious web of socioeconomic relations, their future 
is always precarious; they can be ordered to leave the country if state authorities view their 
presence as not ‘conducive to the public good’ and a threat to public policy or national security. 
In the past, misfortune or injustice or both could easily cause their dislocation and departure. 
Economic recessions have also been used as either reasons or pretexts for the expulsion of 
migrant workers. Additionally, public policy, public morality and national security have been 
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2
 See Article 3 of the Fourth Protocol to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
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interpreted widely by states in order to force the exit of migrant workers. Trivial incidents find 
their way into justifications for exclusion and it is often the case that norms and standards are not 
always administered correctly by lower courts and administrative authorities.  
Fortunately, those migrants who are beneficiaries of European Union law enjoy 
considerable protection against experiences of injustice and illegitimate harm inflicted by state 
authorities because the public policy, public security and public health derogations from the 
Treaty’s provisions on the free movement of persons have to be interpreted strictly and there is a 
demand for the justification of state actions to be in line with the standards prescribed by 
European Union law. 
 But while the traditional discretion enjoyed by states in ordering non-nationals to leave 
their territory has been curtailed by European Union law, and even states which are not members 
of the European Union would not ‘eject at their pleasure’ non-national residents who have not 
committed any offence, the system of protection afforded to offending European Union citizens, 
nevertheless, contains a number of cracks. These will have to be corrected in the near future not 
only because they lead to policy incoherence and gaps in rights protection, but also because they 
threaten to transform European Union citizenship from a fundamental status into a thin overlay 
which, under pressure from national executive power, loses its effect and significance.  
 Investigating those cracks and how they could be corrected is the main focus of the 
present article. True, it may be objected from the outset that no sympathy should be given to 
offending EU citizens residing in the territory of Member States whose rules and laws they fail to 
respect. For by failing to respect the requirements of hospitality, they, essentially, forfeit their 
right to receive such hospitality and to deserve any special protection. Although such a view is 
certainly understandable, most fair minded individuals would find it troubling if the penalty 
imposed for offending conduct does not meet the requirements of proportionality and causes 
irreparable and, in the opinion of some, illegitimate, harm to human beings. 
 4 
  Indeed, it is one thing to accept the penalty accompanying a transgression and quite 
another to be placed outside the society’s circle of membership. Being stripped of membership 
status and being rendered ‘homeless’ shatters lives, destroys personal identities and tears apart 
social and family relations. After all, ‘home’ is not only the place where we feel safe, our lives 
are woven and entangled with the lives of others and where our identities are manifested and 
shaped. In addition to its spatial dimension, ‘home’ also has another temporal dimension in the 
sense that we cannot imagine our life and contemplate future life choices without it. Home settles 
people in the sense that it allows them to make commitments, imagine and plan their future. In 
this respect, ‘homelessness’, that is, being ordered to leave a country in which you have made 
your home, not only makes us feel abandoned and hurt, it also makes us feel futureless. Without 
security of residence, personal autonomy, that is, the right to lead a meaningful life and to make 
life choices, is meaningless. Because deportation not only makes EU citizens’ lives, expectations 
and future less worthy of respect, but also negates them completely, the effect of the public policy 
and public security derogations in Directive 2004/38 on Union citizenship itself must be seriously 
examined.  
 The subsequent discussion is structured as follows. In section 2 we examine the ‘old’ and 
‘new’ interpretative frameworks relating to public policy and public security derogations and 
examine the shortcomings in the judgments in the first cases on Article 28(3) of Directive 
2004/38 that have reached the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). In section 3 we consider 
whether EU migration and external relations laws could shed light on the conceptual ambiguity 
surrounding the terms public security and public policy which underpin deportation decisions, 
while in section 4 we extend our search for a solution to the Court’s interpretation of these terms 
across the four fundamental freedoms. We argue, in section 5, that international migration law, 
and not European Union law, could provide useful pointers and inspiration for the reform of law 
and policy in this area and in the concluding section we discuss, and defend, our proposals for 
institutional reform. 
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2. The public policy and public security derogations: Past and present  
 
The public security, public policy and public health derogations from free movement have been 
marked by a disjunction between governmental interests and sovereign power and EU regulation. 
Member States have been keen to maintain the vestiges of their sovereignty in the sphere of 
migration law. Accordingly, they have preserved the power to restrict the free movement rights of 
Union citizens and their family members on public security, public policy and public health 
grounds (Article 45(3) TFEU). But these grounds must be strictly interpreted and comply with the 
principle of proportionality,
3
 cannot be invoked in order to serve economic ends even in times of 
recession, and cannot be imposed automatically.
4
 Instead, they have to be based exclusively on 
the personal conduct of the individual concerned. The Member States are obligated to verify that 
a Union citizen’s personal conduct poses ‘a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the 
requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’.5 This is not 
merely confined to entry; it also applies to restrictions on the right of exit imposed by the 
Member State of origin on one of its nationals. In Jipa, a reverse discrimination case since the 
applicant requested his state of origin to lift a restriction on his right to cross-border movement 
(Article 38 of Romanian Law 248/2005) in order to travel to Belgium which had repatriated him 
owing to his irregular residence there, the Court ruled that in the absence of a genuine threat to 
public policy or public security the Member State of origin cannot restrict an EU national’s right 
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of exit.
6
 In Gaydarov, the Court ruled that ‘the genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to 
the requirements of public policy’ test, observance of the principle of proportionality and the 
subject of the restrictive measure to effective judicial review can justify the restriction of the right 
of a Member State national to exercise the fundamental rights of entry and residence. The same 
assessment must take place with respect to third country national spouses of EU nationals who 
have been the subject of alerts entered in the Schengen Information System. The CJEU has stated 
that both the Member State issuing an alert and the Member State that consults the Schengen 
Information System must first establish that the presence of a person constitutes a genuine, 
present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.
7
  
The Court’s clear preference for a rights-based approach to the interpretation of the 
Treaty’s derogations from free movement in the internal market shields individuals from the 
discretionary power of states. As protected persons, their interests take priority over the interests 
of states. From this it follows that public policy or security risks must be clearly linked to 
particular persons before any action is taken by national authorities against an EU citizen. By 
requiring concreteness, as opposed to abstract interpretations of threats or risks, and 
contextualism, that is, the identification of real and specific harms caused by individuals’ actions 
as opposed to abstract harms and exaggerated risks flowing from authorities’ perceptions about 
certain (unwanted) individuals and their actions, EU nationals and their families have been 
shielded from utilitarian calculations and arbitrary state practices. Accordingly, a Member State 
cannot order the expulsion of a Union citizen as a deterrent or a general preventive action.
8
 Nor 
can exclusion or expulsion decisions be justified on the basis of governmental policy agendas, 
such as, for example, tackling pornography or organized crime. This also rules out the application 
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of pre-emption or the precautionary principle which became salient in counter-terrorist law and 
policy post 9/11.  
Additionally, previous criminal convictions will not in themselves constitute grounds for 
imposing limitations on cross-border movement.
9
 As Article 27(2) of Council Directive 2004/38 
states, ‘justifications that are isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely on 
considerations of general prevention shall not be accepted’. According to Advocate General 
Mazák, ‘it follows from the ruling of the Court in Commission v Spain that a Member State, when 
limiting the rights granted to Union citizens pursuant to Article 18(1) EC [21 TFEU], cannot rely 
on general non-specific assertions made, in relation to the conduct of a Union citizen, by another 
Member State. A Member State when limiting the fundamental freedoms of Union citizens must 
itself verify and confirm whether the exercise of those freedoms poses a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat to the requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society’ (footnotes omitted).10 True, there is no isomorphism in the definition of public policy 
across the EU – public policy and public security remain ‘national concepts’, that is, they are 
defined on the basis of national laws and traditions. However, the Court has clearly stated for 
more than three decades that the Member States’ discretion in this area is circumscribed by EU 
law.
11
 
Although the strict interpretation of the public policy derogations furnished by secondary 
legislation (Directive 64/221 initially and Directive 2004/38 from 30 April 2006) and the Court’s 
jurisprudence have circumscribed the Member States’ discretionary power, they nevertheless 
continue to deport Union citizens on the basis of enforceable criminal convictions. In Calfa 
automatic expulsion for life following a criminal conviction, without consideration of the 
personal conduct of the offender or the danger (s)he represented, on the basis of public policy, 
was seen to contravene Treaty provisions (formerly Article 49 EC) and Directive 64/221 (now 
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Directive 2004/38).
12
 And Advocate General Stix-Hackl has stated in Commission v Germany 
that ‘the German practice of automatic deportation, without regard for personal circumstances, 
justified on the ground of its deterrent effect on other foreigners and in breach of the fundamental 
right to family life breaches Community law’.13 In Huber the Court took issue with the German 
Central Register of Foreign Nationals and ruled that the prohibition of discrimination on the 
ground of nationality laid down in Article 18 TFEU precludes the establishment of a system 
specifically for Union citizens for processing personal data for the purpose of fighting crime 
while no such similar system exists with respect to nationals of that Member State. But it reached 
the opposite conclusion with respect to the use of a central register for foreign nationals for the 
purpose of regulating their residential status.
14
  
The Citizenship Directive has enhanced security of residence for Union citizens and their 
family members. National authorities contemplating the taking of an expulsion decision must take 
into account a complex array of factors, such as the length of an individual’s residence on the 
national territory since this reflects the strength of his/her link with the host Member State, his/her 
age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration into the host 
Member State and the extent of his/her links with the country of origin.
15
 Frequent and long 
absences from the territory (not exceeding two consecutive years) would presumably indicate the 
existence of a weaker link with the host Member State. In contrast, long and uninterrupted 
residence manifests a greater degree of integration in the host Member State thereby necessitating 
a greater level of protection against expulsion; in such cases, ‘uprooting’ would result in serious 
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and multiple harms for individuals and their families.
16
 In the case of a Union citizen ‘who has 
lawfully spent most or even all of his childhood and youth in the host Member State, very good 
reasons would have to be put forward to justify the expulsion measure’.17  
The Directive also stipulates that permanent residents can be ordered to leave only on 
‘serious grounds of public policy or public security’ (Article 28(2)), and that Union citizens 
resident for the previous ten years and minors may not be ordered to leave the territory of a 
Member State, except ‘on imperative grounds of public security’ (Article 28(3)).18 In addition, 
according to Article 33 of Directive 2004/38, an expulsion order cannot be issued by the host 
Member State as a penalty or legal consequence of a custodial penalty unless the general 
requirements pertaining to the application of restrictions on entry and residence apply (Articles 
27-29) and, if it is issued, it should be subject to assessment after two years (Article 33). In cases 
of interrupted residence in the ten-year period required for the activation of the high degree of 
protection against expulsion under Article 28(3), national authorities can take into consideration 
the duration of each absence from the national territory, the frequency and cumulative duration of 
those absences, the reasons for the absences and any evidence that appears to suggest that the 
individual concerned intended to transfer the hub of his/her life and activities to the Member State 
of origin or another Member State.
19
  
The distinction between the high level of protection provided by the requirement of 
‘serious grounds of public policy and public security’ under Article 28(2) and the higher level of 
protection entailed by the phrase ‘imperative grounds of public security’ under Article 28(3) as 
well as the meaning of the latter phrase have arisen in two recent cases before the Court; namely, 
Case C-348/09 Pietro Infusino v Oberburgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid lodged on 31 August 
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 See recital 24 of the Preamble to Directive 2004/38. See also points 44, 45 and 115-19 of AG Bot’s 
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2009 and the Tsakouridis case noted above. In both cases, the referring courts sought guidance as 
to whether the absence of any reference to public policy matters in Article 28(3) implies that this 
provision is confined to threats to internal and external security of the state which put at risk its 
continued co-existence, its institutions and important public services, the survival of the 
population, foreign relations and the peaceful co-existence of nations. A literal interpretation of 
Article 28(3) appears to lend credence to a restrictionist approach, that is, to its confinement to 
very serious conduct which undermines state security and threatens to jeopardize its functions and 
the survival of the population. But in Tsakouridis, the Court made it clear that the term 
‘imperative grounds of public security’ does not necessarily exclude domestic criminal law 
matters and that the fight against crime in connection with dealing in narcotics as part of an 
organized group, which undoubtedly falls within the ambit of Article 28(2), is capable of being 
covered by Article 28(3).
20
  
This ruling essentially makes the distinction between the second and third paragraphs of 
Article 28 inexact, notwithstanding the existence of close conceptual links between internal 
security and public policy. Underlying the Court’s ruling appears to be the belief that the 
differentia specifica between Articles 28(2) and 28(3) is not the so much the nature of the threat – 
after all, the meanings of public policy and security
21
 cannot be clearly demarcated and, having 
varied meanings in the various Member States, remain national law concepts, albeit 
circumscribed by EU law. Instead, attention should be given to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
surrounding the offending conduct and the ‘high degree of seriousness’ it reflects – elements that 
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 According to AG Bot, the concept of public policy includes, inter alia, the prevention of urban violence, 
the prevention of the sale of stolen cars, protection of the right to mint coinage and respect for human 
dignity; point 63 of AG Bot’s Opinion in Tsakouridis. However, he went on to state that in most of the 
cases, the Court has not made a distinction between the two concepts and used Olazabal to substantiate this 
point. See also paragraphs 43-45 of the Court’s decision.  
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are captured by the adjective ‘imperative’.22 This could be termed the ‘counter-restrictionist’ 
view. 
Accordingly, Tsakouridis gives the impression that national authorities contemplating 
expulsion decisions need not be concerned about the object of the threat, that is whether the 
survival of the state (and its institutions) is threatened. Nor is it the case that what triggers the 
application of Article 28(3) is the ‘specialness’ of the public security threat. Imperative grounds 
of public security do not presuppose the existence of special security threats. Instead, the 
circumstances of the threat must be exceptional thereby justifying the exceptionality of the 
deportation of very long-term residents and minors; the threat must exhibit a high degree of 
seriousness which is not found in ordinary criminal activities.
23
 It would be up to the Member 
State to furnish coherent arguments highlighting the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the 
threat, while EU citizens challenging expulsion decisions would have to produce 
counterbalancing evidence that the threat they pose does not go beyond normal security 
procedures. In other words, the Court’s contribution to the definition of the term ‘imperative 
grounds of public security’ is to shift the focal point of an examination from the type of the 
security threat itself to the security constellation accompanying the offending conduct. For it is 
that security constellation which will move a conduct which could be caught by either public 
policy or public security into the exceptional area of public security.  
This shift has been confirmed by the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Pietro Infusino 
mentioned above.
24
 Infusino, an Italian national, who had lived in Germany since 1987, was 
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in 2006 for the sexual assault, sexual coercion and rape 
                                                 
22
 Paragraphs 40 and 41 of the Court’s Judgment in Tsakouridis n 16 above. 
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 Of course, the test of proportionality must always be carried out and national authorities contemplating 
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May 2012.  
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of his former partner’s daughter who was eight years old when the offences were committed. He 
is due to be released in July 2013, and in May 2008 a deportation order was issued which 
Infusino subsequently challenged. The Higher Administrative Court for the Land North Rhine-
Westphalia, which heard the case on appeal, sought the CJEU’s guidance on the application of 
Article 28(3) of the Citizenship Directive by enquiring as to whether, besides dealing in narcotics 
as part of an organized group, other extremely serious criminal offences fall within its scope. The 
Court drew upon Article 83(1) TFEU which pronounces the sexual exploitation of children as a 
serious crime with a cross-border dimension in which the EU may intervene and Directive 
2011/93 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography,
25
 in order to make an unprecedented widening of the public security derogation, 
since it can now encompass all criminal offences which ‘might pose a direct threat to the calm 
and physical security of the population’ as long as ‘the manner in which such offences were 
committed discloses particularly serious characteristics, which is a matter for the referring court 
to determine’.26 The security constellation surrounding the offence is thus the paramount 
consideration – and not the type of offence. And given that in principle all forms of criminality 
can be seen to pose a direct threat to the calm and physical security of the population, Article 
28(3) becomes a gradation of Article 28(2) of Directive 2004/38. Particularly serious crime can 
thus activate the application of Article 28(3). One cannot but wonder about the reasons that led 
the Court to instigate a definitional isomorphism between public security and public policy (and 
public order) by infusing the former with an ‘everyday’ dimension relating to the preservation of 
the ‘calm and physical security of the population’. While the ‘everydayness’ or ‘normalization’ of 
the public security derogation will please Member States which remain free to categorize conduct 
as contrary to public security ‘according to the particular values of their legal order’,27 it is deeply 
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 OJ 2011 L 335. 
26
 Paragraphs 28-29 and 33 of the Judgment, n 23 above. Pietro Infusino had threatened and isolated his 
victim for a number of years.  
27
 Ibid., paragraph 29. 
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problematic and worrying from the point of view of EU law. The phrase ‘threat to the calm and 
physical security of the population’ constitutes an interpretational innovation (Tsakouridis 
referred to the economic and social danger for society) which undermines the rationale of the 
Citizenship Directive and its objectives of promoting security of residence for long-term resident 
EU citizens and enhancing their citizenship status.
28
 Similarly, the reference to the referring 
court’s assessment of conduct leading to expulsion in the light of ‘the particular values of the 
legal order of the Member State’ (paragraph 29) is so ambiguous that it is bound to lead to legal 
uncertainty and the unequal treatment of Union citizens throughout the European Union. The 
Grand Chamber’s deference to the Member States’ ‘interpretational freedom’ may be attuned to 
the present rise in Euro-scepticism in several countries, but it is certainly at odds with its 
traditional attestation of the strict interpretation of the derogations.  
We have reservations as to whether the shift from security threat to security constellation 
reflects the intentions of the European legislature. If this were the case, Article 28(3) would read 
‘imperative grounds of public policy or public security’ thereby making the difference between 
28(2) and 28(3) an issue of scale, that is, a matter of the degree of the seriousness of the threat. In 
addition, in its Guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
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 Interestingly, AG Bot reached a totally different conclusion by applying the same consideration: Opinion 
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ground of nationality and equal opportunities. Permanent residence in the meaning of the Directive 2004/34 
is not predicated on a ‘test of integration’, as the Netherlands Government submitted, which can be 
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and the Political Morality of Migration and Integration’, in H. Lindahl (ed.), A Right to Inclusion and 
Exclusion? Normative Fault Lines of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford: Hart, 2009), 
185-207. 
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territory of the Member States, the Commission has explicitly stated that ‘it is crucial that 
Member States define clearly the protected interests of society, and make a clear distinction 
between public policy and public security. The latter cannot be extended to measures that should 
be covered by the former. Public security is generally interpreted to cover both internal and 
external security along the lines of preserving the integrity of the territory of a Member State and 
its institutions. Public policy is generally interpreted along the lines of preventing disturbance of 
social order.’29 Having said this, however, one cannot preclude a future amendment of Article 
28(3) so as to include a reference to ‘public policy’. Alternatively, the Court could define the 
types of threats
30
 that could be caught by it in a clear and comprehensive, albeit non-exhaustive, 
manner in its subsequent jurisprudence.  
Notwithstanding the Court’s supervision of Member States’ compliance with EU law and 
the increasing weight and relevance of European Union citizenship, it may be argued that the 
continuation of the practice of deportation on the grounds of security and public policy, 
particularly in the cases of long-term resident EU citizens and minors, undermines the principle 
of equal treatment irrespective of nationality, a principle fostered by Union citizenship. To put it 
differently, is it perhaps time to consider seriously the abolition of Article 28(3)? Given the 
importance of the fundamental status of EU citizenship and the fact that more than ten years 
residence would be the necessary qualifying period for naturalization in most Member States, 
does it make sense to preserve states’ power to break the bond between an EU citizen and the host 
community by ordering his/her dislocation?
31
 After all, it can be plausibly argued that the 
criminal justice system offers ample scope to punish the unlawful conduct of permanent EU 
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 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2009) 313 
final, Brussels, 2 July 2009, page 10. 
30
 These could include armed struggle, terrorism and cyber-terrorism, serious organized crime and cyber- 
crime. An interesting question that arises here is whether a Member State could view an EU citizen’s 
conduct resembling Julian Assange’s Wikileaks disclosures as conduct justifying expulsion from the host 
Member State on ‘imperative grounds of public security’ even after a 20-year residence there. 
31
 Belgium provides absolute protection from withdrawal (and non-renewal) of settled migrants’ resident 
permits since the status of settlement is deemed to be permanent. Additionally, residents born in Belgium 
and those who have lived in Belgium from the age of 12 onwards cannot be deported. 
 15 
citizens in the same manner as that of nationals, without transforming the former into ‘dangerous 
outsiders’ who ‘must be expelled from the national body’.32 In other words, the contingency of 
nationality need not be a critical consideration if an EU citizen has a very solid link with the host 
state owing to birth on its territory, childhood and schooling, age and family connections or long-
term residence exceeding ten years. Such an approach would make the restrictionist/counter-
restrictionist dualism mentioned above obsolete.  
As present, it remains the case that, as far as security of residence is concerned, Union 
citizenship appears to be a lesser status than that of national citizenship. Essentially, it 
approximates to third country national long-term residence status. As Jesse has observed in 
another context, ‘strong protection from forced removal or revocation of statuses is a signal that a 
society accepts individuals as members. Full members of society, i.e., nationals, are not under any 
threat to be expelled. The threat of removal is thus always a reminder of differentiation in status 
and membership.’33 This stratified notion of membership and the degrading of EU citizenship 
give rise to an additional internal contradiction: while the establishment and development of EU 
citizenship have demonstrated that community belonging does not have to be based on organic-
national qualities, cultural commonalities or individuals’ conformity to national values, but can be 
built on de facto associative relations and connections brought about through residence in the host 
community and de jure equal membership as far as possible,
34
 the continued deportation of long-
term resident Union citizens effectively makes nationality the ultimate determinant of 
belonging.
35
 The legal contours of Union citizenship thus become fractured and the European 
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 Compare the emphasis on connections with the host society of an EU citizen who is a permanent resident 
in relation to the execution of a European arrest warrant given by the Grand Chamber in Case C-123/08, 
Dominic Wolzenburg, Judgment of 6 October 2009, paragraphs 64-70. 
33
 M. Jesse, The Civic Citizens of Europe: Legal Realities for Immigrants in Europe and the Legal Potential 
for their Integration, PhD Dissertation, EUI: Florence, October 2010, at p. 259.  
34
 D. Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’, European Law Journal, Vol. 
13(5), 2007, 623-646. 
35
 By so doing, it facilitates the stigmatization of EU citizens and the possible erosion of their special, 
citizen status in the host Member States by official discourses on the deportation of foreign criminals. Such 
anti-migrant and xenophobic discourses have featured in the media in the UK, Italy and the Netherlands 
recently.  
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Union becomes transformed from a community of law into a community of state-defined national 
memberships.  
 
 
3. Looking for guidance inside European Union law 
 
3.1 EU migration and external relations laws 
 
Having identified the analytical as well as empirical shortcomings entailed by Article 28 of 
Directive 2004/38, the crucial question that needs to be addressed now is whether EU migration 
law contains any resources that could be utilized in the process of enhancing the security of 
residence of Union citizens in the host Member State. Directive 2003/109, the so-called long-term 
residence directive, embraces the principle that domicile generates an entitlement to increasing 
security of residence.
36
 Indeed, Recital 16 refers to the ‘reinforced’ protection against expulsion 
that long-term resident third country nationals (TCNs) ought to enjoy. Guided by, albeit not 
perfectly reflecting, the Tampere mandate of providing a set of rights which are ‘as near as 
possible’ to those enjoyed by citizens of the European Union, the Directive embeds the Court’s 
case law concerning Article 39(3) EC (now Article 45(3) TFEU) and Directive 64/221 into 
Article 12: expulsion can take place solely when a TCN constitutes an actual and sufficiently 
serious threat to public policy or public security. Public health, notably, is excluded as a ground. 
In addition, Article 12(2) repeats the provision of the former Directive 64/221 and its successor 
Directive 2004/38 establishing that economic considerations are not permitted grounds for 
making expulsion decisions, while Article 12(3) incorporates the considerations derived from the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in particular with respect to 
                                                 
36
 Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 
16/44, 23 January 2004. 
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Article 8 ECHR (respect for private and family life). However, the standard requirement that 
previous criminal convictions do not automatically constitute grounds for exclusion, entailed by 
Article 3(2) of Directive 64/221 as well as by Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38, was omitted in 
the final version of the long-term residence Directive. Similarly, the standard EU law requirement 
that one’s personal conduct must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat 
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, featured in Article 27(2) of Directive 
2004/38 and discussed extensively in the previous section, is not mentioned.  
True, the above mentioned omissions should not be regarded as fundamental flaws since 
the Court is bound to apply its existing case law by analogy should a case on these matters reach 
it. After all, the Commission’s commentary on the Articles of the Directive clearly stated that a 
person’s personal conduct is the decisive criterion justifying an expulsion decision and that the 
proportionality test has to be met. What, in our opinion, is an important fault line of the long-term 
residence Directive, however, is its silence concerning the enhanced level of protection that 
longstanding residents (for more than ten years) and minors ought to enjoy by analogy with the 
provisions of the Citizenship Directive.  
Statal objections and concerns precluded long-term residents’ equalization in this 
domain.
37
 In Nural Ziebell Advocate General Bot defended the distinction between the increased 
level of protection afforded to longstanding resident EU citizens in the territory of a host Member 
State under Article 28(1) of Directive 2004/38, on the one hand, and the lesser protection 
afforded to TCN residents, including those of Turkish nationality under Article 14(1) of Council 
Decision 1/80, on the other, on the basis of their differing legal status.
38
 And with respect to 
residence in other Member States, a long-term resident TCN may not be allowed to reside if ‘the 
person concerned constitutes a threat to public policy or public security’. However, as Article 
                                                 
37
 On this see S. Peers, ‘Implementing Equality? The Directive on Long-Term Resident Third Country 
National’, European Law Review, Vol. 29 (4), 2004, pp. 437-460, at 452; Diego Acosta Arcarazo, The 
Long-Term Residence Status as a Subsidiary Form of EU Citizenship (Leiden: Brill, 2011), chapter 5. 
38
 Case C-371/08 Nural Ziebell v Land Baden-Wurttemberg, Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 14 April 
2011, points 55, 62 et seq. 
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17(1) paragraph 2 states, ‘when taking the relevant decision, the Member State shall consider the 
severity or type of offence against public policy or public security committed by the long-term 
resident or his/her family member(s), or the danger that emanates from the person concerned’. 
And as Article 17(2) of Directive 2003/109 reiterates, such a decision must not be based on 
economic considerations.  
 The Blue Card Directive, too, includes public policy, public security or public health as 
grounds for withdrawing or refusing to renew an EU Blue Card.
39
 Of course, officials’ decisions 
in such cases should be open to legal challenge in accordance with the relevant national law 
(Article 11(3)). The requirement that individuals should not be considered to pose a threat to 
public policy, public security or public health is also found in Articles 7(1) and 13(2) of the 
Researchers’ Directive40 as well as in Articles 6(1)(d) and 16(2) of the Pupils’ Directive.41 The 
Family Reunification Directive’s preambulary references to public policy or public security, on 
the other hand, are more explicit as regards the meaning of public policy. The Directive states that 
in refusing to grant family reunification on the duly justified grounds, the notion of public policy 
may cover a conviction for committing a serious crime (Article 6) and that the notions of public 
policy and public security also cover cases where a third country national belongs to an 
association which supports terrorism, supports such an association or has extremist aspirations 
(Recital 14).
42
 Having said this, however, it should be noted here that the Family Reunification 
Directive is also attuned to the ECtHR case law:
43
 Article 6(2) paragraph 2 states that ‘when 
taking the relevant decision, the Member State shall consider, besides Article 17, the severity or 
type of offence against public policy or public security committed by the family member, or the 
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 Article 9(3)(a) of Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third 
country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, OJ L 155/17, 18 June 2009. 
40
 Council Directive 2005/71 EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third country 
nationals for the purposes of scientific research, OJ L 289/15, 3 November 2005. 
41
 Council Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of third country nationals for the 
purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, OJ L 375/12, 23 
December 2004. 
42
 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251/12, 3 
October 2003. 
43
 Moustaquim v Belgium, 18.2.1991 Series A no 193 and Beldjoudi v France, 26.3.1992. 
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dangers that are emanating from such person’. And Article 17 of the Directive requires the 
Member States to take into account three criteria, namely, family ties, the duration of residence in 
the host Member State and the existence of links with the country of origin; ‘Member States shall 
take due account of the nature and solidity of the person’s family relationships and the duration of 
his residence in the Member State and of the existence of family, cultural and social ties with 
his/her country of origin where they reject an application, withdraw or refuse to renew a residence 
permit or decide to order the removal of the sponsor or members of his family’. Evidently, this 
list is shorter than the list of considerations applying to expulsion decisions taken against EU 
citizens – age, state of health and social and cultural integration in the host Member State are not 
mentioned.
44
 Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that EU 
migration law does not contain any resources which could be utilized in closing the protection 
gaps identified in Chapter VI (public policy, public security or public health restrictions) of the 
Citizenship Directive. It is destined to approximate, rather than to supplement or expand, the 
European Union provisions on the free movement of Union citizens.  
 Since EU migration law cannot be of assistance, external relations law could well be a 
source for inspiration and direction. EEA nationals (including citizens of Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein) and those enjoying derived rights of residence as family members of Union 
citizens residing on the territory of the host Member State are protected against expulsion. The 
Citizenship Directive removed the family members’ dependency requirements in the case of 
death or departure of the Union citizen (Article 12 of Directive 2004/38), in the event of divorce, 
annulment of marriage or termination of the registered partnership (Article 13) or after five years 
of residence (Article 16). In addition to this privileged category of beneficiaries, beneficiaries of 
the agreements concluded by the Community and third countries, such as, for example, the 1963 
                                                 
44
 Compare here Article 28(1) of the Citizenship Directive. 
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EEC-Turkey Association Agreement,
45
 its 1970 Protocol
46
 and Decision 1/80 of the Association 
Council,
47
 enjoy security of residence. Indeed, according to Article 14(1) of Decision 1/80, the 
right of residence of a Turkish worker can be terminated on the grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health. The Court has held that the interpretation of Article 14(1) must mirror 
the interpretation given to these grounds as regards the rights of nationals of EU Member States 
and, in particular, the existence of a criminal conviction must constitute evidence of personal 
conduct posing a threat to the requirements of public policy and the threat must be genuine and 
sufficiently serious.
48
 Accordingly, expulsion cannot be ordered on general preventive grounds.
49
 
The family members of Turkish workers, spouses and children, enjoy security of residence too. In 
fact, public policy, public security and public health considerations and absence from the host 
territory for a significant length of time without justification are the only two grounds on the basis 
of which they can be expelled.
50
  
A lesser tier of protection is envisaged under the Maghreb Agreements (Tunisia, 
Morocco and Algeria) of 1976 which offer protection from discrimination in working conditions, 
social security and dismissal and subject the length of validity of the residence permit issued to a 
worker to public policy, public security and public health considerations.
51
 The same applies to 
the so-called Europe Agreements (the agreements concluded with Central and Eastern European 
countries, Baltic states and Slovenia) which provided for a right to free movement for self-
employment and protection from discrimination in working conditions.
52
 The Europe Agreements 
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 Decision of 19 September 1980. 
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included a provision subjecting the exercise of the right of establishment to limitations imposed 
by the Member States on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
53
 But no 
innovative ideas have been generated by the application and interpretation of these Agreements as 
regards the public policy and public security derogations.
54
 The interpretation given to these 
derogations is serialized in judgments and there is little or no departure from the established line 
of reasoning. What we are witnessing, therefore, is the contiguous effect of EU law and the 
CJEU’s legitimate quest for coherence in the (strict) interpretation of the public policy, public 
security or public health derogations. After all, interpretative divergence in this area would not 
only contradict the Court’s ruling in Nazli,55 but would also raise the spectre of affording the 
Member States different degrees of discretion to exclude individuals depending on their 
nationality, thus permitting discrimination on the ground of nationality.  
 
3.2 Public policy and public security in the case law of the CJEU 
 
Another source of inspiration might be the case law of the CJEU on the public policy and 
public security derogations across the four fundamental freedoms. Our survey of 233 judgments 
between the period of 1974 and 2011 (26 judgments regarding free movement of capital, 106 
regarding free movement of goods, 30 regarding free movement of persons, and 71 regarding free 
                                                                                                                                                 
University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, April 2000, and Council of Europe, Strasbourg, August 2000, 
available at <http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/docs/status.pdf>, last accessed 23 October 2012. 
53
 For a comprehensive analysis, see Elspeth Guild, Nick Rollason and Rupert Copeman-Hill, A Guide to 
the Right of Establishment under the Europe Agreements (London: Baileys Shaw and Gillett in association 
with ILPA, 1996). 
54
 Arguably, the same applies to provisions pertaining to EU external border law. The concepts of public 
policy, public security and national security entailed by the Schengen Implementing Convention (CISA) 
1990, which forms part of the Schengen acquis which was integrated into the EU framework at Amsterdam 
(Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999, OJ L176, 10 July 1999) have not been defined, thereby 
inviting divergence in definitions provided for by national laws. Article 96 CISA provides pointers as to 
when an alien could be deemed to be a threat to public policy or public security for the purposes of 
entrance into the Schengen Information System.  
55
 See n 47 above. 
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provision of services and freedom of establishment),
56
 reveals a prevalence in the use of 
derogation grounds in the field of free movement of goods, followed by its use in the field of free 
provision of services and freedom of establishment, and lastly in the field of free movement of 
persons and capital.
57
 
Although all derogation grounds have been invoked throughout time to a greater or lesser 
extent, their discussion in CJEU judgments has indisputably increased in the 2000s and that is 
observable in relation to all derogation grounds: the survey has included 10 judgments from the 
1970s, 53 from the 1980s, and 56 from the 1990s, as opposed to 114 since 2000. The different 
relevance of each derogation ground in relation to the different freedoms is also striking: public 
health has clearly been more relevant in relation to free movement of goods (78 cases) and free 
provision of services/establishment (14 cases) than in relation to free movement of persons (3 
cases) or free movement of capital (no case identified); public policy has been relevant in relation 
to free movement of goods, persons and provision of services/establishment (14, 18 and 20 cases 
respectively), but less relevant in relation to free movement of capital (4 cases); public security 
has been equally relevant with regard to all freedoms except free movement of persons (6 cases of 
free movement of goods, 5 cases of free movement of capital and 4 cases of free provision of 
services/establishment, but only 1 case of free movement of persons); finally, public interest has 
only been significant in relation to free movement of capital (17 cases) and free provision of 
                                                 
56
 This selection of case law includes decisions that have, one way or another, contributed to the definition 
of the scope of the derogation grounds under analysis; decisions that only tangentially refer to these 
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applied and one of the grounds in question was particularly relevant, the most relevant ground invoked was 
afforded precedence for the purposes of this classification.  
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services/establishment (27 cases), but not in relation to free movement of goods (1 case) or free 
movement of persons (2 cases). Public policy is, therefore, the ground most commonly invoked to 
derogate from free movement of persons (18 judgments relating to public policy, as opposed to 
only 3 relating to public health, 1 to public security, 2 to public interest, and 6 to all or a mix of 
derogation grounds).
58
 Public health and public security also appear to be the grounds invoked 
more successfully (29.5% and 37.5% success rates respectively) in all four fields followed by the 
public policy and public interest derogation grounds (with success rates of 10.7% and 14.9% 
respectively).
59
 Public policy is the ground most commonly invoked to derogate from free 
movement of persons: it has been invoked in 24 (80%) out of the 30 free movement of persons 
cases included in our survey, as either the only ground (in 18 cases) or a complementary one (in 6 
cases). 
The notion of public policy has perhaps been the most contentious amongst all derogation 
grounds. This owes much to the fact that there is not a ‘uniform scale of values’60 across all EU 
Member States, thereby leading the court to accept a certain margin of appreciation in 
determining the precise definitional content of public policy. Over time, it has brought within its 
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 Cases 115 and 116/81 Rezguia Adoui v Belgian State and City of Liège; Dominique Cornuaille v Belgian 
State [1982] ECR 1665, paragraph 8; C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others/Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615, paragraph 60. 
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ambit issues relating to combating organizations which are deemed to be non-conducive to the 
public good,
61
 limiting the free movement of individuals with a criminal record,
62
 preventing the 
export of coins no longer legal tender,
63
 avoiding the registration of stolen vehicles,
64
 maintaining 
the non-commercial and pluralistic nature of a broadcasting system,
65
 supervising financial 
dealers,
66
 avoiding tax evasion/avoidance (and more generally guaranteeing the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision),
67
 combating the use of drugs,
68
 ensuring road safety,
69
 combating gaming and 
betting,
70
 prohibiting games simulating acts of homicide,
71
 protecting young people,
72
 and more 
generally fighting criminal activities.
73
 Conversely, a range of other types of conduct have been 
excluded from the reach of the public policy derogation (at least on the precise facts of the case). 
These include the exercise of trade union rights,
74
 engaging in legal but ‘morally suspect’ 
activities,
75
 using a specific shape of wine bottle,
76
 protecting consumer rights,
77
 fixing a 
minimum price for fuel,
78
 refusing to accord sickness benefit to a director of a company formed in 
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accordance with the law of another Member State,
79
 imposing restrictions on the nationality of 
owners of companies responsible for the development of data-processing systems for public 
authorities,
80
 requiring prior registration with a social security scheme of the host State or 
registration with one particular social security scheme,
81
 imposing a quota on moorings for non-
resident owners,
82
 limiting the free movement of individuals not complying with legal formalities 
concerning the entry, movement and residence of aliens,
83
 allowing a non-member country to 
revoke, suspend or limit (air) traffic rights,
84
 and limiting the activity of non-national private 
security undertakings.
85
 And as already stated in section 2 above, any conduct triggering the 
public policy derogation must involve a ‘genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the 
requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’, a phrase that 
has been frequently repeated by the Court since its first invocation in Bouchereau.
86
 In addition, 
the application of the public policy derogation does not depend on the imposition of penal 
sanctions
87
 and, as has been widely acknowledged, purely economic objectives are excluded from 
the scope of the public policy derogation ground.
88
  
Besides the above mentioned general principles guiding the application of the public 
policy derogation, reflecting the ‘strict interpretation’ approach favoured by the Court, one cannot 
find insights relating to its definition which could migrate from the fields of free movement of 
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goods, establishment and services and capital to the free movement of persons. Its ambit is varied 
and flexible. In addition, judgments have started to refer to an unclear notion of ‘public order’, 
seemingly meaning public policy, thereby intimating inconsistency either in the use of legal 
terminology or, more prosaically, in translation.
89
  
 
 
4. Why international migration law is more relevant than ever 
 
If neither EU migration and external relations laws nor the CJEU’s case law can shed light on the 
meaning of the public policy and public security derogations, perhaps we should consider the 
extent to which international migration law could provide useful pointers as well as inspiration. 
The choice of international migration law as a possible point of departure has much to do with the 
fact that legal orders have become increasingly multilayered and interlaced. It is also due to the 
realization that norms in law, as indeed in other fields such as politics or economics, do not arise 
in a vacuum. Additionally, they have a capacity to permeate borders of all sorts; they readily 
migrate across spaces, legal orders and time precisely because they hold the promise of offsetting 
as well as solving social coordination problems and rights violations.  
The need to protect migrant workers against arbitrary expulsion often ordered at the 
whim of the governmental authorities of the host state was felt acutely in the post-World War II 
era. In this respect, the protective provisions of Directive 64/221, which has been mentioned 
earlier, mirrored provisions entailed by international conventions. Admittedly, this is hardly 
surprising; most legal instruments are essentially mosaics entailing unique rearrangements of pre-
existing elements and legal fragments derived from various sources. More specifically, the 1949 
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ILO Migration for Employment Convention (No 97), which entered into force in 1952, contained 
a number of protective measures. Recommendation R 086, which accompanied the 1949 
Convention, envisaged the migrant workers’ protection against removal from the host state for 
lack of sufficient means or the state of the employment market.
90
 It included the recommendation 
that ‘in principle no migrant shall be removed who has been [in the host state] for more than five 
years’.91 The increasing importance of the rights of non-citizen residents in host states was also 
highlighted by the initiatives taken under the aegis of the Council of Europe. The 1955 European 
Convention on Establishment
92
 undoubtedly contributed to changing assumptions about the 
allegedly unfettered sovereign prerogatives of states as regards the rights of ‘aliens’ in their 
jurisdiction. The obligation of states to facilitate the movement of nationals of other state parties 
was accompanied by the qualification that the activities of the persons concerned ‘would [not] be 
contrary to ordre public, national security, public health or morality’ (Article 1). The same 
applied with respect to expulsion. But what is worth highlighting here is the Convention’s clear 
distinction between public order and national security – a distinction that is not reflected in the 
EU’s rules on free movement. Having said this, however, we should also note that the European 
Convention on Establishment offered Member States a wide margin of discretion in interpreting 
these terms
93
 – certainly wider than the provisions of Directive 64/221 and the subsequent case 
law, since public order could include the exclusion of non-citizens on the ground of their political 
activity. But unlike the relevant EC rules prior to the adoption of the Citizenship Directive 
2004/38, the 1955 Convention envisaged a system of graduated security of residence. 
Interestingly, the Convention provided that lawful residents for a period of at least two years 
could only be expelled on ‘imperative considerations of national security’ and they could 
challenge a decision and appeal against it before a competent authority of the host state (Article 
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3(2)). Legal residence of over ten years confined the expulsion to ‘reasons of national security or 
for the commission of offences of a particularly serious nature against ordre public or morality’ 
(Article 3(3)). 
Subsequent conventions, such as the European Social Charter
94
 and the Revised 
European Social Charter
95
 include the right of migrant workers and their families to protection 
and assistance; Article 19(8) of the Revised European Social Charter states that lawful residents 
should not be expelled ‘unless they endanger national security or offend against public interest or 
morality’. The European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers,96 on the other 
hand, reiterates the grounds of ‘reasons of national security, public policy or morals’ as 
exceptions to the rights of migrant workers to admission (Article 4(3)) and non-withdrawal of the 
residence permit (Article 9(5)(a)). To this regional regime of protection of migrant workers’ 
security of residence one should add the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR which prohibits the 
collective expulsion of foreigners (Article 4).  
 In the early 1970s, the expulsion of the Asian population by Uganda highlighted the need 
for a more robust protection of migrant workers against arbitrary expulsions which had the effect 
of shattering people’s lives overnight. The UN looked at the possibility of taking steps to protect 
the human rights of non-citizens and Baroness Elles produced a draft declaration on the human 
rights of individuals who are non-citizens of the country in which they live (the so-called Elles 
draft declaration) in 1974.
97
 The Elles draft declaration entailed the rights of non-citizens to 
‘freedom of movement and residence within the territory of the host country, subject, however, to 
such restrictions as are absolutely necessary for compelling reasons of public policy, public order, 
national security, or public health or morals’ (Article 4[iii)]). And subsequently, the Draft 
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which 
                                                 
94
 CETS No 35, signed in Turin on 18 October 1961. 
95
 1996 CETS No 163. 
96
 CETS No 093, adopted in Strasbourg in 1977. 
97
 See Richard Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 51 et seq. 
 29 
They Live, adopted by the open-ended working group of the UN General Assembly,
98
 stated that 
‘the collective expulsion of aliens on the ground of criteria of race, religion, culture or any other 
discriminatory criterion is prohibited’ (Article 7).  
The privileging of the concrete lives of migrant workers over states’ power of exclusion 
is also entailed by the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families which affirms the right of migrant workers to 
leave their home state without any illegitimate restrictions. Restrictions are only legitimate if they 
are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or 
morals or the rights and freedoms of others and are consistent with the other rights recognized in 
the present part of the Convention Article 8(1). Migrants should not be subject to collective 
expulsions and expulsion decisions must comply with strict procedural safeguards (Article 22). 
The 1990 Convention also provides an additional tier of protection for documented workers: 
Article 56(2) states that ‘[e]xpulsion shall not be resorted to for the purpose of depriving a 
migrant worker or a member of his or her family of the rights arising out of the authorization of 
residence and the work permit’, while the next paragraph of the same Article states that ‘[i]n 
considering whether to expel a migrant worker or a member of his or her family, account should 
be taken of humanitarian considerations and of the length of time that the person concerned has 
already resided in the State of employment’.99 
More innovative and protective provisions have been brought forward in the new 
millennium. The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendations Rec No 15 (2000) 
on the security of residence of long-term migrants states that ‘member states may provide that a 
long-term immigrant should not be expelled (…) after ten years of residence, except in the case of 
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conviction for a criminal offence where sentenced to in excess of five years of imprisonment 
without suspension’; and ‘[a]fter twenty years of residence, a long-term immigrant should no 
longer be expellable’ (4(b)). The subsequent paragraph also states that ‘long-term immigrants 
born on the territory of the member state or admitted to the member state before the age of ten, 
who have been lawfully and habitually resident, should not be expellable once they have reached 
the age of eighteen. Long-term immigrants who are minors may in principle not be expelled’ 
(4(c)). Arguably, such provisions could be readily utilized by the EU. Similarly, the Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation No 1504 (2001) on the non-expulsion of long-
term immigrants invited national executives to: ‘[11]g. take the necessary steps to ensure that in 
the case of long-term migrants the sanction of expulsion is applied only to particularly serious 
offences affecting state security of which they have been found guilty; h. (…) guarantee that 
migrants who were born or raised in the host country and their under-age children cannot be 
expelled under any circumstances’.100  
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that international migration law contains 
important resources which could be utilized in a process of reforming Article 28 of the 
Citizenship Directive. Certainly, a case for greater isomorphism between EU law and 
international migration law could be defended and actualized by either confining Article 28(3) 
(i.e., the expulsion of EU citizens following ten years of residence in the host Member States and 
of minors) to national security grounds alone or even making long-term resident EU citizens and 
minors non-expellable, ‘except if the expulsion is necessary for the best interests of the child’, as 
stated in Article 28(3)(b). Certainly, for minors who have been born or raised in the country, 
expulsion constitutes such a seriously harmful act that it is impossible to justify from a normative 
point of view. Such a normative and legal ‘spillover’ would enhance the fundamental status of 
                                                 
100
 Available at <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/EREC1504.htm>, last accessed 23 
October 2012. 
 31 
Union citizenship and make a concrete difference to the private and social lives
101
 of those 
beneficiaries of Directive 2004/38 who, for whatever reason, became transgressors of the law. 
After all, as Akerlof and Kranton have observed in another context, ‘some of the most dramatic 
examples of regime change involve changes in norms regarding who is an insider and who is an 
outsider’.102  
 
 
5. Why national particularism is counterproductive: Proposals for law and policy reform 
 
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the impact of humanitarian considerations and norms on 
the progressive enhancement of the security of residence of migrant workers in the host country 
and defended the case for a greater parallelism between EU and international migration law. 
There has been a coherent underlying logic of circumscribing state discretion concerning the 
expulsion of long-term migrant residents and capturing in law newcomers’ complex entanglement 
with the host society. Such entanglement with the host society makes them de facto members 
entitled to conduct their business and lives without the threat of forced removal or revocation of 
their residence statuses under ‘flexible’ definitions of public policy or public security threats. Ten 
years of residence, which is also the period required for eligibility for naturalization and 
acquisition of citizenship in several Member States, provides a reasonable cut-off point for the 
removal of long-term EU migrant offenders.
103
  
                                                 
101
 The ECtHR has acknowledged that the expulsion of settled migrants may interfere with the enjoyment 
of their right to private life which includes the social ties forged between settled migrants and the 
community in which they live, in addition to possible interferences with the right to respect for their family 
life under Article 8 ECHR; Mikulic v Croatia, no. 53176/99, paragraph 53.  
102
 George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, Identity Economics; How our Identities Shape our Work, 
Wages and Well-being (Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 125. 
103
 Elspeth Berry defends an argument for the existence of a presumption against the deportation of ‘virtual’ 
nationals, that is, migrants who were born or raised in the host Member State. She argues that this would 
improve legal certainty and enhance non-discrimination; E. Berry, ‘The Deportation of “Virtual National” 
Offenders: The Impact of ECHR and EU Law’ (2009) 23 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Law, 11-23. 
 32 
 The growing significance of European Union citizenship and its increasing alignment 
with fundamental rights also lends support to the above argument. Since EU citizenship is truly a 
fundamental status, then the continued removal of EU offenders following ten years of residence 
cannot be justified. Indeed, if EU citizens can be turned into expellable ‘foreigners’, 
notwithstanding their longstanding entanglement with, and participation in, the host society 
which EU law has facilitated through a variety of free movement provisions, including the 
permanent resident status established by Directive 2004/38,
104
 then one could possibly argue that 
their membership had always been second class. They had never become ‘one of us’ or parts of 
the fabric of society in the host Member State.  
There has also been a progressive realization in Europe of the need to provide 
unequivocal protection to migrant children born or raised in the host country and of bridging the 
dissonance between children’s own perception of themselves as ‘insiders’ (as ‘one of us’) and 
governments’ perception of them as continued ‘outsiders’ (as ‘not one of us’) even when they 
find themselves on the wrong side of the law. Migrant children who have spent all or most of 
their childhood in a society, been brought up and educated in line with its guiding principles and 
frameworks and have their home there should not be treated as ‘non-belongers’ and undeserving 
residents if they become law-breakers. After all, there is hardly any evidence to suggest that law-
breaking is either a by-product of their ‘alien’ nationality or an act intimately associated with a 
certain nationality status. To pretend that there is would be tantamount to concealing its social 
dimensions, notwithstanding its complexity and varied manifestations, and to uncritically tolerate 
nationalistic proclamations about ‘dangerous aliens’ contaminating the alleged purity of the 
national society or discursive narratives about undeserving EU citizens who violated a country’s 
hospitality rules and therefore must be expelled. As Judge Martens has observed in Beljoudi, 
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‘mere nationality does not constitute an objective and reasonable justification for the existence of 
a difference as regards expulsion’.105  
Children who have spent all or most of their childhood in a certain country are so 
intimately connected with their social surroundings that their removal does not only shatter the 
social world they legitimately call their own but also their personal identities which have been 
formed within this social world. And in the same way that it would be regarded as both 
disproportionate and deeply troubling if a state decided to revoke a person’s citizenship status 
because he/she committed a criminal offence, it should be considered to be equally 
disproportionate and troubling if migrant children’s membership status were automatically erased 
if they committed the same offence. Punishment
106
 in both cases cannot, and should not, result in 
erasing their societal membership status and crushing their lives. In this respect, there exist 
powerful reasons for making the treatment of national minors and migrant minors assimilable and 
for questioning the assumption that there exists an incommensurability between law-compliance 
and the possession of a certain nationality. 
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It is true that EU law has thus far provided the most comprehensive system of ensuring 
security of residence for EU citizens, but as we saw in section 2, the correct implementation of 
Directive 2004/38 remains a challenge
107
 and there is a need for improving its relevant provisions. 
International migration law can furnish ideas and insights for reform which are consonant with 
European Union law norms and capable of enhancing the latter’s integrity as well as effectiveness 
in national arenas. In this respect, a revised Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38 should either 
confine an expulsion decision against long-term resident EU citizens and minor EU citizens to 
imperative grounds of national security, ‘along the lines of preserving the integrity of the territory 
of a Member State and its institutions’108 or those categories of citizens should not be expellable 
at all. Additionally, the inclusion of a fourth paragraph in Article 28 of Directive 2004/38 stating 
that ‘collective expulsions, including expulsions of ethnic groups, are prohibited’ is necessary in 
view of the expulsion of Roma in Italy and France.  
 The alternative is, of course, national divergence. And national divergence may be 
consonant with the doctrine of statist positivism, but it also results in creating both holes in the 
system of protection of EU citizens afforded by EU law and layers of injustice. There may well 
exist as many as 27 differing legal provisions concerning the definitions of public policy and 
public security in the EU owing to the wide discretion enjoyed by the Member States. The ECJ 
has acknowledged that the term ‘public policy’ is a national law concept subject to national 
interpretation.
109
 As mentioned in Gaydarov, ‘while Member States essentially retain the freedom 
to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in accordance with their 
national needs, which can vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another, 
the fact still remains that, in the European Union context and particularly as a justification for a 
derogation from the fundamental principle of free movement of persons, those requirements must 
be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State 
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without any control by the institutions of the European Union’.110 Further, the progressive 
development of Union citizenship and its constitutional metamorphosis into a fundamental 
status
111
 challenges the maintenance of the status quo. EU citizenship, which has been developed 
mainly outside the domain of state sovereignty, cannot be compromised by acts designed to 
preserve state sovereignty and nationalistic understandings of societal membership and 
belonging.  
In addition, although all Member States recognize that long-term residents and certain 
groups ought to have a more secure residence status and stronger procedural guarantees against 
their expulsion from the host state, their respective provisions differ as regards their personal 
scope, the stipulated duration of residence and the degree of reception of ECtHR case law. As 
such, they could hardly provide a guide as to how the terms ‘public policy’ or ‘public security’ 
need to be interpreted, what the meaning of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ is, and what 
kind of protection should be offered to minors who have few or no links with the country which 
features in their passport or their parents’ passport. For instance, while in Germany the length of 
residence or residence status or birth there as second or third generation offspring would not 
guarantee security of residence, in Belgium settled migrants can only be removed if they have 
gravely harmed public order and security.
112
 Additionally, the expulsion of those born in Belgium 
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or who have lived there from the age of 12 onwards is prohibited.
113
 This means that the second 
or third generation migrant children are entitled to full security of residence even though they 
may have not acquired Belgian nationality. Besides Belgium, Austria, France, Hungary, Portugal 
and Sweden also prohibit the deportation of second generation migrants on account of a criminal 
record. In these states, migrants who arrived in the host country during childhood are also 
protected, notwithstanding the existence of divergence regarding the precise age of newcomers. 
In contrast, according to the German Residence Act (AufenthG),
114
 had the same migrant child 
been born in Germany, he/she would not be in a position to enjoy security of residence even if the 
offence committed there were relatively minor.  
 In the light of the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that national regulatory 
autonomy in this field leads to the creation of several ‘tiers’ of protection of EU citizens and to 
unpredictability, thereby rendering the EU citizenship status a weak and feeble overlay or, 
perhaps, even a fiction. The task is to maintain the gravity of liberal norms, the importance of the 
fundamental status of EU citizenship and the new and broader social space it has created. We 
need to go forward, not backward. This can only be done if between the fictional and the real, 
between ‘foreignness’ and EU citizenship, between the state and the individual, between 
sovereignty and security, space emerges for critical reflection and for institutional change. For the 
continued expulsion of long-term resident EU citizens and minors should not be viewed as a mere 
manifestation of Member States’ prerogatives in the fields of migration and security; it tests the 
meaning and significance of European Union citizenship and impacts on the particularization of 
the ideals underpinning both liberalism and European integration.
115
 And adherence to these 
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ideals, at the very minimum, requires that no interpretation of the Citizenship Directive should be 
arbitrary, even more so when it implies harm to human beings and injustice.  
